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A Solution for Developing Countries’ 
Problem with WTO Noncompliance 
LIRAN ALIAV* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Countries around the world are beginning a slow move towards 
equality. From internal campaigns, such as the “Occupy Wall Street” 
protests, to global campaigns, such as trade controversies in the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), petitioners are demanding relief from 
their alleged oppressive state.   
For centuries, philosophers have grappled with how to best run an 
economy.1 For the most part, the WTO seeks to eliminate 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations in order to 
better the world economy.2 Trade ministers in the WTO believe that free 
trade will promote economic development, alleviate poverty, and 
ultimately ensure better opportunities and welfare gains for all members 
participating in the multilateral trading system.3 
An unregulated free trade economy is majestic in theory since 
other factors, such as politics and environmental concerns, will 
influence international trade aspects.4 States impose regulations that 
promote their nation’s agenda, which may consequently affect 
international political battles.5 The essential concept behind free trade is 
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; Master of Laws in Taxation, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A., 
University of California at Los Angeles, 2009. The author would like to thank the dedicated staff 
of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review for their tireless efforts 
and helpful feedback during the editing process.  
 1. See JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 3–4 (2002).   
 2. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 501–31 (3rd ed. 1995). 
 3. Carmen G. Gonzales, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 435 (2002) [hereinafter 
Institutionalizing Inequality]. 
 4. See KYLE BELL, FREE TRADE OR FAIR TRADE 1–3 (2009).   
 5. See DAVID LANGLET, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT AND HAZARDOUS TRADE: 
REGULATING TRADE IN HAZARDOUS GOODS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, FREE 
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4–5 (2009). 
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that having a world economy allows every state to utilize its 
comparative advantages for the betterment of the economy as a whole.6 
Domestic regulation, however, negates this central principle by giving a 
competitive disadvantage to foreign producers.7 For instance, “[t]rade-
restricting effects frequently occur even with facially nondiscriminatory 
regulations because the different geographic or market positions of 
foreign producers often make it more costly to comply with demanding 
regulations.”8 
The WTO seeks to clear roadblocks to trade on a global scale by 
enforcing the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).9 Like 
the Dormant Commerce Clause in the United States, the GATT includes 
sections that prohibit certain regulatory measures that act as obstacles to 
international trade.10 These regulatory measures are usually products of 
legislative policies that promote protectionism or the ideologies of a 
select domestic group, such as lobbyists.11 
The recent WTO decision, Philippines—Taxes on Distilled Spirits, 
highlights the tension some states wrestle with in the promotion of their 
economic agendas.12 On one hand, the Filipino government required 
excise taxes on imports in the hope that it would stimulate their 
underdeveloped economy. On the other hand, the Philippines benefited 
from the free trade policies imposed by the WTO through the GATT. 
The WTO concluded that the Filipino government could not tax 
imported distilled spirits at a higher rate than it does domestic distilled 
spirits.13 While the WTO correctly decided this case by applying the 
GATT, the WTO must shy away from its rigid enforcement of GATT 
principles to level the playing field for developing countries that have 
little influence within the political arena.  
Part II of this comment will address the background of the 
Philippines case and the reasons why the WTO came to its conclusion. 
 
 6. MICHAEL M. J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
FREE TRADE 486–87 (3rd ed. 2005). 
 7. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-
Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (1994). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally Donald. P. Kommers & Michael Waelbroeck, Legal Integration and the 
Free Movement of Goods: The American and European Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH 
LAW, BOOK 3, FORCES AND POTENTIAL FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY 165 (Mauro Cappelletti et 
al. eds., 1986). 
 10. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 
art. XX [hereinafter GATT]; see also Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1403. 
 11. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKLEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991).  
 12.  Panel Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Aug. 15, 2011). 
 13.  Id. at 98B. 
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Next, I will compare similar cases upholding the same analysis and 
discuss the history of the WTO’s tests comparing “like products” under 
the GATT. In assessing these tests, I will highlight the problems with 
each test and show how it evolved to the form of the test the WTO 
implements today.  
Part III will discuss the issues surrounding WTO compliance in 
developed countries. I will compare the concept of facially neutral but 
discriminatory laws under the Commerce Clause in the United States 
with those of the GATT. Part IV will propose a solution for the WTO 
that would alleviate tensions between developing countries seeking to 
stimulate economic growth and those countries that use their stronger 
political influence to strategically circumvent the WTO and the GATT. 
The section will also address rebuttals and how the proposed solution is 
compatible with capitalism in the United States. I conclude that 
developing countries such as the Philippines should be able to impose 
taxes, in a facially neutral but possibly discriminatory manner, on 
uncooperative developed countries in order to further their economic 
agenda and level the international playing field. 
 
II.  ANALYZING THE COURT’S DECISION IN THE PHILIPPINES— 
TAXES ON DISTILLED SPIRITS  
A.  History Behind the Case 
Distilled spirits are made from different types of raw materials 
such as sugar, palm and grains.14 Alcohol producers can make products 
labeled with the same name from different raw materials.15 For instance, 
whiskey is produced by fermenting either wheat or sugar.16 Both wheat-
based whiskey and sugar-based whiskey are labeled “whiskey” and are 
usually interchangeable products in the common household.17 
The Philippines is a major producer and exporter of sugar, nipa, 
coconut, cassava, and palm (the “designated materials”).18 Since the 
country is blessed with these raw materials, Philippines-based producers 
almost always manufacture their distilled spirits from the designated 
materials. Producers in other countries, however, produce distilled 
spirits with other raw materials. Thus, most of the alcohol imported into 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at ¶ 7.61. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
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the Philippines is not produced from the designated materials.19  
The Filipino government taxes distilled spirits made from different 
raw materials at dissimilar rates.20 As a result, all imported alcohol is 
subject to a higher tax, resulting in lost profits for foreign producers.21 
For several years, the U.S. Government has been urging the Filipino 
government to change their tax fee schedule, both bilaterally and in 
WTO forums.22 In addition, the European Union requested WTO 
dispute settlement consultations on these taxes in July 2009, and were 
joined by the United States in October 2009.23 The European Union and 
the United States (hereinafter “Petitioners”) brought suit in the WTO 
under GATT Article III:2, and other sections, prohibiting the imposition 
of different tax rates on similar products. 
Article III:2 of the GATT states, “[t]he products of the territory of 
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.”24 In other words, regardless of 
domestic or international origin, like products should be subject to the 
same direct and indirect excise tax rates.25  
The WTO panel received written submissions from Petitioner in 
October 2010 and issued an interim report on May 4, 2011. The panel 
then issued its final reports on June 27, 2011.26 The appellate body 
circulated its report on December 21, 2011.27 This paper will explore the 
Panel’s assessment of the case. 
B.  The Criteria to Assess Like Products 
1.   Trouble with Assessing “Like” Products 
The WTO has not always used the same factors to assess whether 
 
 19. Id. at ¶ 2.37.  
 20. Id. at ¶ 2.2–2.3. 
 21. Id. at ¶ 7.183.  
 22. U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging Philippine Excise Taxes (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/january/us-files-wto-case-
challenging-philippine-excise-ta. 
 23. Id.  
 24. GATT art. III:2. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Panel Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Aug. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter Philippines Tax Case]. 
 27. Report of the Appellate Body, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Dec. 
21, 2011). 
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two products are “like” under Article III:2.28 The test has been a product 
of evolution, and rightfully so.29 Assessing “like” products is extremely 
difficult, especially when accounting for the differences in cultures, 
environment, production, uses, and other external and internal factors.30  
One descriptive scenario where the test for “like” products has 
been applied is where two countries have classified the same product 
differently.31 For instance, an object may be used similarly by both 
country A and country B. However, the object may be considered 
harmful to country A’s environment, but be useful and harmless to 
country B. Therefore, country A may label the product as an 
“environmentally unfriendly material” and impose taxes on it. Country 
B, on the other hand, may label it as “promoting health and good 
economy” and incentivize its production by offering subsidies and tax 
breaks.32 Both products may look exactly the same, and may be used in 
the same way, but are ultimately classified differently because of 
external factors that reflect each country’s political, social, and 
economic agenda.33  
2.  How the WTO Came to its Conclusion  
The Philippines taxes whisky, gin, brandy, rum, vodka, tequila, 
and liqueurs at a lower rate when they are made from the “designated 
materials.34 The fermentation process converts these raw materials into 
ethyl alcohol and the manufacturer distills the product to its liking.35 
The color, odor, and taste of the alcohol are natural results of the 
distillation of ethyl alcohol.36 In the Philippines, domestic producers 
distill their alcohol from sugar cane molasses, which is one of the 
designated materials.37 There is no evidence that suggests that a 
layperson in the Philippines can distinguish between imported and 
domestic spirits based on the raw materials used to produce them.38 
 
 28. Edward S. Tsai, “Like” Is a Four-Letter Word – GATT Article III’s “Like Product” 
Conundrum, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 26, 46–47 (1999). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at 1.171.  
 35. Id. at ¶ 2.22. 
 36. Id. at ¶ 2.25. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at ¶ 2.26. 
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3.  Assessing a Violation of the First Sentence 
of Article III:2 of the GATT  
The WTO Panel assessed the likeness of the products by analyzing 
each type of distilled spirit on a product-by-product basis.39 The first 
sentence of Article III:2 reads, “[t]he products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.”40 The WTO answered two 
questions to determine whether a violation of Article III:2 of the GATT 
existed: (1) whether the imported and domestic products were “like” 
products, and (2) whether the imported products are taxed in excess of 
the domestic products.41 If both questions could be answered in the 
affirmative, then the Philippines was in violation of of Article III:2.42  
The WTO analyzed “likeness” by assessing four factors: (1) the 
product’s properties, nature, and quality; (2) the product’s end uses in a 
given market; (3) consumers’ tastes and habits; and (4) tariff 
classification.43 The Court clarified that the products do not have to be 
identical since the language of the GATT would have said “identical” 
instead of “like products”.44 The Court then analyzed whether the tax on 
international products was in excess of the domestic product.45  
a.  Like Products Factors 
i.  The Product’s Properties, Nature and Quality 
The appellate body in European Commission – Asbestos ruled that 
this category is “intended to cover the physical qualities and 
characteristics of the products.”46 The Philippines argued that since the 
raw materials are wholly different, the chemical composition of the 
different brands and the organoleptic properties of spirits are not 
 
 39. Id. at ¶ 7.19. 
 40. Id. at ¶ 7.8. 
 41. Id. at ¶ 7.30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 7.31. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 7.32. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 7.34 (citing Appellate Body Report, Citing EC – Asbestos, para. 110). The 
appellate body referenced this in analyzing likeness according to Article IV; however, the Panel 
in Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits found that it should be applicable to Article II as well.  
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“like”.47 The court disagreed.48   
The court found the Philippines’ argument unpersuasive since the 
chemical composition or organoleptic properties do not divide the 
spirits produced from different raw materials into separate identifiable 
groups.49 The court even examined the organoleptic properties of each 
type of alcohol and concluded that even if the chemical compositions 
are different due to the use of different raw materials, the alcohol results 
in the same organoleptic properties.50 For instance, producing alcohol 
with different raw materials or with distinct fermentation processes may 
result in alcohols that have different colors, such as with brandy, 
whisky, and tequila. The taste that is associated with that alcohol 
remains the same because they are neutral alcohols.51 The Panel thus 
concluded that the properties, nature, and quality of the product are 
similar.52  
Moreover, the court asserted that the difference in raw materials is 
only relevant to the extent that it results in a dissimilar final product.53 
The court found that all distilled spirits in the present dispute are similar 
in that they are concentrated distilled potable alcohol with varying 
alcohol content.54 In addition, consumption of distilled spirits usually 
causes similar physiological effects due to the presence of ethyl 
alcohol.55  
ii.   End Uses 
In assessing this factor, the WTO looks to see if the products serve 
the same or similar end uses.56 The panel found that the end uses of 
alcohol are “thirst quenching, socialization, relaxation and pleasant 
intoxication.”57 Since the manner in which people drink the product 
does not depend on what raw materials were used in the production, the 
court found that there are no differences in the products’ end uses.58  
 
 47. Id. at ¶ 7.40. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at ¶ 7.42–7.47.  
 51. Id. at ¶ 7.36. 
 52. Id. at ¶ 7.39. 
 53. Id. at ¶ 7.37. 
 54. Id. at ¶ 7.35.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at ¶ 7.48. 
 57. Id.  
 42. Id.  
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iii.   Consumers’ Tastes and Habits  
By applying this factor, the WTO ensures the product is not used 
for different functions.59 Filipino consumers’ tastes and habits are a 
product of personal experience, product reputation, brand loyalty, and 
their limited propensity to switch brands based on income and 
expenditure constraints.60 
The Philippines argued that the brands are not substitutable and 
offered a survey by Abrenica and Ducanes that concluded there is low 
price elasticity in the Philippine domestic distilled spirits market.61 
Petitioners argued that the taxes are part of the reason why the price of 
imported brands is high and therefore unappealing to the majority of the 
Philippines population.62  
The WTO criticized both parties’ reports and studies because they 
assume that the domestic price will increase and the imported price will 
decrease simultaneously.63 The court explained that the increase in 
consumption could be caused by an increase in domestic price, a 
decrease in imported price, or a combination of both.64 Since the rate of 
consumption was impossible to predict, the studies were flawed.65  
The Philippines also argued that the population is separated into 
two groups based on purchasing power.66 The majority of the 
population, segmented into the lower purchasing power group, only 
consumed distilled spirits made from designated raw materials.67 
Therefore, the Philippines concluded that habits and tastes are set for 
this specific group.68 The WTO rightfully found the fallacy of this 
argument since it assumes that if the group with lower purchasing 
power has the ability to purchase more expensive alcohol, they would 
refrain from doing so because of habit. This assumption was not 
 
 59. Id. at ¶ 7.49. 
 60. Id. at ¶ 7.50. See also M.J. Abrenica and J. Ducanes, On Substitutability Between 
Imported and Local Distilled Spirits (Oct. 10, 2010), Panel Exhibit (PH-49) at the University of 
Philippines School of Economics Foundation.  
 61. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at  ¶ 7.52, ¶ 7.55. A narrowing of price differentials 
between imported distilled spirits and domestic Philippines distilled spirits results in a small 
change in their respective market shares.  
 62. Id. at ¶ 7.52, 7.54 (arguing that “on average at an import price decrease of 25% and   
domestic increase of 50%, consumers were 4.9% more willing to purchase imports and 4.0% less 
likely to purchase domestics . . . if price were no issue, on average, consumers were 43% more 
likely to purchase local brands and 86% more likely to purchase imported ones”). 
 63. Id. at ¶ 7.58. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at ¶ 7.56. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 7.58.  
 68. Id. at ¶ 7.58–7.59. 
  
2012] A Solution for Developing Countries 9 
supported by the Philippines.69  
In addition, the court found that the cheaper domestic spirits mimic 
the labels of their imported counterparts even when they are produced 
by different raw materials.70 For instance, domestic producers label 
“blended brandy” as “brandy” to mimic the label of its imported 
counterpart.71 Moreover, the labels do not mention the type of raw 
material used in making the product.72 As a result, the court found that 
the tastes and habits of the consumers are not different regarding 
domestic or imported spirits.73     
iv.  Tariff Classification 
The court found that the Harmonized System (“HS”), which is the 
rate schedule that describes the products and provides the tax rate of 
each item, does not differentiate between different raw materials used 
for production of the spirits.74 The court held that “all distilled spirits at 
issue in this dispute, whether imported or domestic, and irrespective of 
the raw materials from which they are made, fall within the HS heading 
2208, which refers to “undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic 
strength by volume of less than 80% vol[ume]; spirits, liqueurs and 
other spirituous beverages.”75  
b.  Excess Taxation  
The second question that the court addressed is whether the 
international product is taxed “in excess of” the domestic product.76 Past 
panels have held that “even the smallest amount of excess is too 
much.”77 The panel noted that the difference in tax rate for the 
international product is about ten to forty times the rate imposed on the 
domestic product.78 The Philippines did not dispute this fact.79 
Therefore, the court concluded that there was excess taxation.80    
      
 
 69. Id. at ¶ 7.58–7.59. 
 70. Id. at ¶ 7.61. 
 71. Id. at ¶ 7.62. 
 72. Id. at ¶ 7.61. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at ¶ 7.63.  
 75. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 76. Id. at 7.86. 
 77. Id. at ¶ 7.87 (quotation omitted). 
 78. Id. at ¶ 7.88. 
 79. Id. at ¶ 7.89. 
 80. Id. at ¶ 7.90. 
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4.  Assessing a Violation Under the Second Sentence  
of Article III:2 of the GATT.  
The second sentence of Article III:2 of the GATT provides that 
“no contracting party shall . . . apply internal taxes to imported or 
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1”.81 Article III:1 states that, “taxes and other internal 
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements . . . should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production.”82  
The court also assessed whether the products are “directly 
competitive or substitutable products” and whether “they are not 
similarly taxed”.83 The court concluded that both of these elements were 
present after analyzing similar factors to those used in assessing a 
violation under the first sentence of the GATT.84      
The court then analyzed whether the Philippines implemented the 
tax to afford protection to domestic production. Petitioners argued that 
the magnitude in tax difference alone supports the claim that the excise 
tax is applied “so as to afford protection”.85 Complainants also pointed 
to a lack of rationality of the product differentiation used by the 
measure, the fact that the measure is de facto discriminatory, and the 
fact that the Philippines were aware of the discrimination.86  
On the other hand, the Philippines argued that the tax differentials 
are de minimis and are “rooted in historical association between liquor 
made from designated raw materials and the average Filipino, who is a 
low income person.”87 The Philippines also argued that the tax is origin-
neutral, giving any producer the opportunity to take advantage of the 
lower tax rates.  
In considering “whether the dissimilar taxation affords protection, 
the Panel [sic] found it is not a question of intent or aim, but rather one 
of the protective application of the measure.”88 The court ascertained the 
“protective application” by examining the tax design, architecture, and 
revealing nature.89 The court concluded that the taxes afforded 
protection because all of the Philippine products were produced from 
 
 81. GATT art. III:2. 
 82. Id. at III:1 (emphasis added). 
 83. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at 7.96 (quotation omitted). 
 84. Id. at ¶ 7.138. 
 85. Id. at ¶ 7.170 (quotation omitted). 
 86. Id. at ¶ 7.171–7.172. 
 87. Id. at ¶ 7.174–7.175 (quotation omitted). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 7.180. 
 89. Id. at ¶ 7.180. 
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designated materials as opposed to a small percentage of foreign 
products.90 The court also concluded that the legislative intent is not at 
the heart of the assessment of protectionism.91 
5.  The History of the Likeness Test 
The WTO had its fair share of problems defining “like” products 
under Article III:2. Early cases in the WTO adopted a two-step test for 
assessing a violation of Article III:2.92 The first step was to evaluate 
whether the imported and domestic product was “like” or “directly 
competitive or substitutable.”93 The second step was to compare the 
difference in tax burdens on the products in controversy.94 
The panel in the “Border Tax” report noted that “likeness” depends 
on both objective and subjective criteria.95 Objective refers to 
composition and manufacturing process, while subjective refers to 
consumption patterns and general uses of the product.96 However, the 
panel injected an element of vagueness to ensure discretionary and 
subjective judgments by stating that minor differences in physical 
properties would not prevent products from qualifying as “like 
products.”97 Only if the court determined that the products were “like” 
did it then inquire into whether the country taxed the product 
discriminatorily.98 As a result of this tiered test, a finding of “likeness 
triggers a very protective trade standard.”99 
Subsequent panels reconsidered the approach in the Border Tax 
report. In United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, the panel added another consideration to the previous 
method of assessing likeness: the like product determination should 
account for the purpose of Article III as a whole.100 The panel noted the 
article’s purpose is to prevent the use of internal taxes and regulation to 
protect domestic production, as opposed to preventing differential 
 
 90. Id. at ¶ 7.182, 7.187. 
 91. Id. at ¶ 7.184. 
 92. Tsai, supra note 28, at 30. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 30–31.  
 95. Panel Report, Japan—Customs, Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported 
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 5.7, L/6216-34S/83 (Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Japan – 
Customs, Duties and Labeling Practices]. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Tsai, supra note 28, at 31. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 32.  
 100. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, ¶ 5.24, 
DS23/R -39S/206 (June 19, 1992) [hereinafter Malt Beverages Panel].  
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treatment for policy reasons.101 As a result, the “like product” test 
incorporated a new element into its assessment: whether it violates 
Article III’s prohibition against protecting domestic producers.102 
Eventually, the two-step test evolved into a one-step test.103 The 
test, called the “aim-and-effect test,”104 assessed solely the motives 
behind the regulation to find a discriminatory purpose, which violated 
Article III:2.105 This test, however, was problematic because the panel 
now needed to differentiate between valid and invalid regulatory 
schemes without first assessing whether the product was similar.106 
Under this test, the distinction between “like products” and “directly 
competitive or substitutable product” vanished.107 Rather, the test 
inquired into whether the tax was implemented with a desired outcome 
of discrimination and whether the tax actually did discriminate between 
the two products.108 As one can imagine, the aim-and-effect test 
essentially opened the doors for courts to find any two products similar, 
so long as they were in direct competition or substitutable.109  
Nevertheless, the aim-and-effect test is attractive because it 
functions to enhance the regulatory autonomy of Member states.110 This 
approach can save legitimate domestic regulations, such as the 
regulations for non-protectionist food labeling rules and protecting 
historic buildings.111  
The aim-and-effect test, however, may cause an accidental 
disadvantage against imported products.112 In addition, the aim-and-
effect test is prone to circumvention.113 Because the determination of 
likeness depends on the legislature’s purpose for implementing the 
measure, problems arise with legislation that has more than one aim.114 
Manipulation of legislative history to avoid WTO suits115 and translation 
issues with the texts can produce ambiguous, obscure, manifestly 
 
 101. Id. at ¶ 5.25 
 102. Tsai, supra note 28, at 33–34.  
 103. Id. at 35.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 34. 
 106. Id. at 35–36.  
 107. Id. at 36. 
 108. Id. at 35. 
 109. Id. at 36. 
 110. Won Mog Choi, Overcoming the “Aim and Effect” Theory: Interpretation of the “Like 
Product” in GATT Article III, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107, 115 (2002). 
 111. Id. at 116. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 117–18. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 119. 
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absurd, and unreasonable aims.116  
Over the past two decades, scholars have proposed solutions to the 
weaknesses of the aim-and-effect test and the two-step product test that 
would incorporate the goals and motives of the GATT. For instance, 
one scholar suggests that the WTO should exclude extraneous factors 
from the assessment of likeness to enhance court predictability and 
stabilize the concept of like products.117 
The aim-and-effect test did not last long.118 The 1996 Panel Report 
on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages119 disposed of the aim-and-
effect test by arguing that the GATT’s language, read literally, did not 
support the test.120 According to the panel, Article III:2 requires the 
court to assess two separate legal obligations: (1) likeness, and (2) 
directly competitive or substitutable.121 The panel essentially revived the 
prongs of the two-step “like product” test, while also adding another 
prong.122 The steps thus became: (1) whether the products were similar, 
(2) whether the contested measure was an “internal tax” or “other 
internal charge,” and (3) whether the tax imposed on foreign products 
was in excess of that imposed on domestic products.123  
Even with this improved two-step test, scholars still criticize the 
test’s lack of consideration for extraneous factors.124 The new test 
implemented by Japan Alcohol Panel is a literalist approach, which 
compels the court to abide by the GATT’s language. The problem with 
this test, however, is that there may be a loophole in the GATT.125 This 
loophole could be exploited if it were to easily pass the Japan Alcohol 
Panel prongs.126  
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III.  COMPARING THE GATT WITH THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A.  The United States’ Dormant Commerce Clause 
Article III of the GATT resembles the United States’ Dormant 
Commerce Clause (“DCC”). While the DCC lacks a clear textual basis, 
its judicial interpretations employ the same basic principles under which 
the GATT is modeled.127 In effect, the DCC seeks to equalize the 
economic playing field by prohibiting the implementation of 
discriminatory laws on free trade between the states.  
Courts interpreting the DCC have classified cases into three 
categories. The first category consists of facially discriminatory 
measures taken against interstate commerce. For instance, in City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court nullified a law that 
prohibited importing waste from other states because it discriminated 
against articles of commerce coming from outside the state.128 The Court 
reasoned that, “unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to 
treat them differently,” the measure is facially discriminatory.129  
The second category involves those laws that are not facially 
discriminatory. The Supreme Court ruled that if the law has a 
discriminatory effect while not being facially discriminatory, then the 
law violates the DCC.130 If a law has a discriminatory effect, the state 
has the burden to “justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing 
from that statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives 
adequate to preserve the local interest at stake.”131 
The third category also involves facially nondiscriminatory 
regulations that negatively affect interstate commerce.132 As opposed to 
having a “discriminatory effect,” as in the second category, these 
regulations have an incidental effect and are subject to a balancing 
test.133 The court balances the need for such a regulation, based on some 
legitimate purpose, with the degree of discrimination and the effects of 
the law on interstate commerce.134 
The problem with these classifications is drawing the line between 
categories two and three.135 Usually, the provisions the WTO deems 
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constitutional have public health or safety issues at stake.136 Some courts 
have suggested the third category only applies to discriminatory burdens 
rather than baleful effects.137  
Over time, however, the balancing test has proven to be somewhat 
lax.138 Typically, the state is only required to present some evidence of a 
regulatory benefit while the court usually considers the law “as the 
empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of 
legislation.”139  
Typically, a statute that discriminates between different products 
based on their location of manufacture is facially discriminatory.140 In 
those cases involving facially neutral regulations, courts look for 
discriminatory intent, use of a proxy characteristic, competitive 
advantage, and uniformity and consistency in order to assess its degree 
of discrimination.141  
B.  The GATT’s Correspondence with the DCC  
The GATT is an international agreement that contains protectionist 
trade barriers promoting free world trade.142 Its structure starts with 
“tariff bindings,” which set a maximum rate for tariffs for each item.143 
Aside from the bindings and rules related to them, the GATT raises the 
same issues as the DCC under U.S. law.144 Like the DCC, GATT courts 
classify laws as facially discriminatory or facially neutral.145 In addition, 
much like in the DCC, the GATT lays out exceptions in Article XX for 
when discriminatory measures are enforceable, such as when the 
measures involve a widely accepted regulatory objective for health and 
safety.146  
When dealing with a facially discriminatory policy, the GATT 
requires a more elaborate legal analysis of the exceptions to 
discriminatory measures than the DCC.147 This is because the GATT 
gives weightier attention to a country’s plea for justifying its regulation 
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or law.148 Since the WTO regulates more than one country,149 it must be 
sensitive to the varying justifications given by States having a unique 
outlook on the global market and different social customs and traditions. 
On the other hand, the DCC only regulates the United States, where 
people have similar social and economic norms, which results in less 
variance within the law.150 Moreover, each state must comply with 
federal law and may not opt-out of the Constitution. Therefore, a WTO 
panel, made up of judges and representatives from different parts of the 
world, must be more lenient in their assessment of like products and 
violations of the GATT policies. 
When dealing with facially neutral classifications, the GATT does 
not divide the category into two subcategories like the DCC.151 The 
GATT usually deals with two types of facially neutral measures – those 
that “provide different taxes or regulatory treatment for two groups of 
similar products in a way that places all or most foreign products in the 
disadvantaged category;”152 and those that have exactly the same 
restrictions placed on both international and domestic producers such 
that it is “substantially more difficult for foreign producers to comply 
with because of their different geographical or market positions.”153 The 
aforementioned Philippines case can be viewed as a mixture of both 
facially neutral types. The alcohol tax distinguishes between the raw 
materials used in distilling the alcohol in a country where most domestic 
production of the spirit is made from raw materials found domestically, 
subjecting the domestic companies to a lower tax rate.  
C.  The Inherent Problem of Taxation Between Developed  
and Developing Countries.  
The relevant factor indicating discrimination here is the use of a 
proxy characteristic.154 This applies when a state regulates on the basis 
of some neutral characteristic that “has little independent significance 
and is in reality a proxy for geographic differences—that is, the 
characteristic is shared by virtually all in-state firms and virtually no 
out-of-state firms.”155 In the Philippines case, the Panel found the tax 
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discrimination criteria based on raw material used to manufacture the 
product had little independent significance and was set up to 
discriminate between all in-state firms and virtually no out-of-state 
firms.156  
But how could the panel be certain that the taxes were set up for 
this alleged purpose? Let us consider this scenario: Filipino alcohol 
manufacturers found a business opportunity in the sale of alcoholic 
beverages. These manufacturers compared the cost of manufacturing 
alcohol with different raw materials and realized that it was more 
profitable to use domestically produced materials. These manufacturers 
then approached the country’s legislature to propose a bill taxing them 
at a favorable rate. Assume that the Philippines have a comparative 
advantage and a niche in the market of sugar cane. The Filipino 
government understood that by charging a more favorable rate, it would 
stimulate their economy (farmers, transportation companies, and 
processing plants all prosper as a result) and produce much needed 
revenue for the country’s development programs. Without the intention 
to discriminate against foreign produced items, the Filipino government 
then passed a tax law granting a more favorable rate to anyone using the 
specified raw materials to produce any alcoholic spirits.  
The policy does not inherently discriminate against international 
markets. Any manufacturer can take advantage of this tax break by 
producing their alcohol with such materials. Why should a developing 
country, in desperate need of revenue to stimulate its economy, not 
exploit the fruits provided by its land? How should a country that does 
not have the manpower to exploit cheap and efficient labor such as 
China, or does not have the capital to build technological schools and 
promote scientific research, advance its economic agenda to compete 
with the rest of the developed countries on a global scale? The answer 
lies below. But before addressing the answer, another issue must be 
addressed to justify the solution and shed light on the injustice within 
the WTO.   
D.   Developed Countries and GATT Adherence 
The “national treatment” rule found in Article III of the GATT 
requires that internal taxes and internal regulations treat foreign goods 
no less favorably than “like” domestic goods.157 Its principal aim is to 
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promote fairness by treating all contracting parties similarly.158  
Often, however, the playing field is far from fair. For instance, the 
Bush administration, in an effort to promote the agendas of its 
agricultural lobby, passed an “aggressive” farm bill in 2002.159 The bill, 
named the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (“Farm 
Bill”), gave an artificial advantage to American farmers by providing 
incentives in the form of subsidies.160 As explained below, with these 
subsidies in place, many farmers produced at capacity instead of 
responding to market demands.161 
Currently, the United States spends about three billion dollars per 
year subsidizing its own farmers.162 The European Union also subsidizes 
its farmers heavily.163 For instance, farmers with cows get a subsidy of 
two dollars per cow a day.164 The trade distortion created by these 
subsidies substantially affects developing countries’ ability to compete 
in the world market.165 Scholars have noted that “excessive subsidies 
lead to overproduction, depression of world prices, and the reduction of 
many developing nations’ farmers to poverty.”166  
Developing countries usually have a specific dominant industry in 
agriculture.167 Job opportunities are usually limited so some devote their 
lives to learning the operational skills needed for that specific market.168 
Economists predicted a force out of countries that are currently 
otherwise in compliance with international agreements, such as the free 
trade regulations of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.169 In addition, Argentina and Brazil are projected to suffer 
damages in the amount of 39 billion dollars because of the change in 
commodity prices due to this Farm Bill.170  
The Farm Bill also affected the Philippines, a member of the WTO 
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since 1995.171 The country’s officials believed that the cheap price of 
labor in their country would balance out the inflated prices abroad.172 
The government predicted that accessing world markets through the 
WTO would create a “net gain of a half-million farming jobs a year, and 
improve the country’s trade balance.”173 This proved to be false because 
of the subsidies given to farmers in other countries such as in the United 
States and the European Union.174  
It is almost impossible for a small developing country such as the 
Philippines to compete against the billions of dollars in subsidies given 
to international farmers.175 The Philippines have lost hundreds of 
thousands of farming jobs since joining the WTO.176 Some Filipinos 
view the Farm Bill’s impact on domestic farmers as a modern version of 
imperialism.177  
In the Philippines, the subsidies given to American and European 
farmers help them sell grain at a price that is less than the break-even 
point for farmers in developing countries.178 One news writer describes 
the subsidy process as “kicking aside the development ladder for some 
of the world’s most desperate people harvesting poverty around the 
world.”179 Allowing the markets to run freely without the aid of 
subsidies would improve the global welfare by a projected 120 billion 
dollars.180 
The Farm Bill conflicted with the United States’ commitments to 
the World Trade Organization.181 Under the WTO, “actionable” 
subsidies were allowed so long as “they do not (a) cause an injury to a 
domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullify or impair the benefits 
other Members are accruing under the SCM182 Agreement; or (c) cause 
serious prejudice to the interest of another Member.”183 One 
commentator stated that:  
Agriculture and food are fundamental to the well-being of all people, 
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both in terms of access to safe and nutritious food and as foundations 
of healthy communities, cultures and environment . . . . Instead of 
ensuring the right to food for all, these institutions have created a 
system that prioritizes exportoriented [sic] productions and has 
increased global hunger and poverty while alienating millions from 
productive assets and resources such as land, water, and seeds.184 . . . 
It is time that we insist on trade policies of Washington based on 
sound policy and reason, rather than on the supposed necessities of 
maintaining a political and market dominance.185 
While many members of the WTO and scholars disapproved of the 
Farm Bill, proponents of the bill justified its $19.1B ceiling on subsidies 
by pointing out that other countries subsidized their farmers at higher 
ceiling rates of $60B for the European Union and $30B for Japan.186 
Another justification for the proposed rate is that $19.1B is far less than 
what was spent before the bill was passed.187  
E.  Playing Games with Compliance 
The 2007 successor to the Farm Bill did not alleviate the issues its 
predecessor had with the WTO.188 Since the 2007 Farm Bill gave 
“producers the option of remaining in the 2002 counter-cyclical 
payments program,” it did not remedy the problems endemic to the 
counter-cyclical payments program, namely its price-contingent 
nature.189 In response to continued conflicts with the WTO, the United 
States passed the Average Crop Revenue Election Program (“ACRE”) 
in 2009.190 While it attempts to comply with the WTO cyclical payments 
rulings by basing them on yields instead of prices, WTO members are 
nevertheless not satisfied with ACRE because the subsidy is still in a 
category that hurts other WTO members.191 
Specifically, the 2007 Farm Bill caused “market loss and price 
suppression to the upland cotton market”.192 It seems that, with respect 
to WTO compliance, some legislators continue to be resolute and 
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hostile.193 On the other hand, proponents of WTO compliance in the 
United States continue to argue that WTO compliance will require a 
meaningful restructuring of the subsidies program.194  
United States noncompliance has enraged many developing 
countries.195 These countries have waited five years, since the 2002 
Farm Bill, for some positive movement towards WTO compliance.196 
Before the Farm Bill of 2012 was passed, these countries were 
aggravated with and resented its proposed legislation.197 Brazil, for 
instance, expected reforms in the 2007 Bill after their favorable ruling 
in the Upland Cotton case in the WTO in 2005.198 When the United 
States failed to deliver, Brazil authorized a $4B sanction on the United 
States as a form of retaliation.199  
IV.  THE SOLUTION TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ NONCOMPLIANCE  
WITH THE GATT 
In view of the foregoing, one might ask why developing countries 
such as the Philippines should stay in the WTO? While the WTO aims 
to protect free trade around the world, its goal of equal product 
treatment hurts underdeveloped countries while having a negligent 
effect on powerhouses such as the United States and China. Proponents 
of the WTO argue that these underdeveloped countries gain access to 
world trade that would be more costly if they were to withdraw from the 
WTO. However, market liberalization in developing countries does not 
always follow from the WTO’s efforts. For instance, the 1990’s WTO 
agreement on agriculture hindered the ability of developing countries to 
liberalize their markets.200 Developed countries evaded the obligations 
of the agreement through tariffs and by strategic use of its provisions.201  
Developing countries rely on tariff revenues to finance food 
production programs, such as research and extension services, irrigation 
projects, and investment subsidies.202 Exempting developing countries 
from tariff reduction for sensitive agricultural commodities would 
enable a developing country to promote domestic food production, 
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thereby reducing international market dependence.203 While this solution 
seems practical, it is also implausible considering the WTO’s strict 
enforcement of the GATT’s language in the likeness test. In addition, 
these countries may already have reduced tariff rates based on the 
GATT.204 It is therefore necessary to look to other solutions, such as 
those that may require modifying the GATT, in order to equalize the 
playing fields between developing and developed countries.  
The United States plays a two-faced game. On the one hand, it 
ratified a treaty that should result in fair free market trading. On the 
other hand, it delays compliance with unfavorable WTO decisions. 
Judging by the reforms in the 2007 Farm Bill and in ACRE, it seems 
that the United States is finally on the path towards compliance, albeit 
with a camel instead of a mustang. In the meantime, foreign developing 
markets such as the Philippines are nearing bankruptcy.205  
The solution lies in playing hardball with the rules of the WTO. 
Those countries that are hurt by developed countries’ noncompliance 
with WTO decisions should have other options besides imposing 
sanctions and trade barriers. They need a tool in their arsenal that is not 
facially illegal under the GATT, but is dangerous in the hands of 
developing nations. One possible solution lies in the Dormant 
Commerce Clause of the United States.  
As discussed above, the DCC classifies different laws into three 
categories: (a) facially discriminatory, (b) facially neutral with a 
discriminatory effect, and (c) facially neutral without a discriminatory 
effect. Those laws passed by developing countries that are facially 
neutral but have a discriminatory effect should be allowed under the 
GATT under these criteria: (1) the country is developing; (2) the 
developing country has an enforceable judgment by the WTO against a 
developed country’s law(s); (3) the developed country has not complied 
with the judgment within a specific time frame; (4) the developing 
country must show that the developed country’s noncompliance is 
negatively impacting its economy.  
The impact of such a law would make any developed country think 
twice about non-compliance. It would give any developing country the 
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ability to tax international products in a facially neutral yet 
discriminatory manner. If we take United States noncompliance with 
the Upland Cotton decision as an example, the effect of such a policy 
would allow all non-developed countries to impose taxes on foreign 
producers like the United States, such as a tax on alcoholic beverages 
central to the Philippines case. In essence, giving this edge to 
developing countries should balance out the fear of noncompliance in 
the international community.  
The beauty of such a principle lies in the fact that it would not 
violate GATT principles of discrimination between countries. A law 
that said, for example, “The United States shall pay X tax on all 
imported corn,” would still be actionable in the WTO because it is 
facially discriminatory. However, developing countries can look to their 
own strengths and exploit the opportunity created by these new rules. 
For instance, if developing country X is a major producer or 
manufacturer of sugar cane, then it can impose taxes in a way that the 
Philippines have done with their alcoholic spirits. The Philippines did 
not tax other countries unfavorably, but rather imposed a tax on the raw 
materials that made up the product.  
         It is imperative that we define the proposed criteria. The first 
criterion—the country must be developing—is problematic.   What 
constitutes “developing”? One solution is that the WTO could 
categorize countries based on their gross domestic product. The 
WTO would define countries that fell below a particular percentage 
or rank as “developing”. However, it is more effective to define a 
nation as developing by using a multi-category economic index, such 
as Heritage’s Index of Economic Freedom. The Index ranks 
countries based on the assessment of ten economic factors, such as 
government spending, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, 
monetary freedom, and property rights.206 After ranking them, the 
index groups the scores into categories of “economic freedom.”207 A 
country that falls under the category of “Mostly Unfree” would be 
considered a developing country.208  
The problem with this system lies in the cut-off. Countries on the 
wrong side of the cut-off may start underreporting revenues and engage 
in otherwise deceitful activities to lower their standards so that they can 
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take advantage of passing facially neutral discriminatory laws. The 
solution is to have a non-partisan third party conduct the studies. In 
addition, the countries on the cusp of “developing” would be dissuaded 
from misreporting numbers because their economy may plummet. 
Trading partners would be less inclined to continue the same business 
ties with a country that is losing economic stability.  
The second criterion—the developing country has an enforceable 
judgment by the WTO against a developed countries’ law(s) – is 
straightforward. The WTO decision should be enforceable, final, and 
not be subject to appeal.  
The third criterion—the developed country has not complied with 
the judgment within a specific time frame—is harder to conceptualize. 
Every product has a different shelf life. Grape producers in one 
developed country may be more sensitive to time than producers in a 
different country. Therefore, it is imperative that the WTO consider 
each case individually and set a date for each case in which this 
proposed law would take effect, should the developed country choose 
not to comply with the WTO’s decision.  
The final criterion—the developing country must show that 
noncompliance by the developed country is negatively impacting its 
economy—should be closely monitored. The developing country must 
use economic data and research that demonstrates the law is adversely 
impacting their economy. Again, exaggerated assessments, bribes, and 
corruption may ensue. Therefore, non-partisan third parties should 
conduct the studies. The developing country should apply to the WTO 
for third party economic assessment research. Once the country meets 
these criteria, the WTO can grant the country the ability to tax in 
facially neutral ways.  
Through this process, the hope—and, indeed, the plausible 
reality—is that developed countries should start to comply with these 
decisions. Otherwise, the economic consequences would be substantial. 
Its deterrent effect should be sufficient to prevent countries from ever 
having to utilize this new tool.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Countries choose to become members of the WTO in hopes of 
developing their economy. The history of the WTO proves that while 
many countries in the WTO sue others to alleviate some wrong practice 
or procedure affecting their economy, these same countries may 
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nevertheless neglect to comply with other WTO rulings.209 For the most 
part, when countries neglect to comply with WTO decisions, it is 
because of internal or external political battles and environmental 
considerations. Typically, strong developed countries have more 
bargaining clout and leeway when it comes to WTO compliance than 
developing countries, such as the Philippines.  
The Philippines case and the U.S. Farm Bill illustrate the point 
above. The United States has not complied with the WTO ruling to fix 
its agricultural subsidies. The subsidies given to American farmers 
allow them to lower their prices on agricultural items in the world 
market, forcing foreign producers, such as those in the Philippines, out 
of the market. Not only are these developing countries suffering from 
underdeveloped economies, but now they must struggle to maintain 
their place in the world market by battling subsidies.  
Concurrent with its violations of WTO rulings, the United States 
sues developing countries in the WTO to equalize the taxes on alcoholic 
beverages. While the United States is correct in that the Philippines is 
taxing the spirits in violation of the principles in GATT, it is unfair to 
force one country to comply with WTO rulings while the other plays a 
foot-dragging game with the world.  
To alleviate this problem, the WTO must arm developing countries 
with a new weapon. Unlike existing weapons, such as sanctions, a new 
weapon should be specifically tailored to non-compliant, developed 
countries. Sanctions may or may not force a developed country to 
budge. WTO case filings show that domestic corporations and groups 
sway the developed countries into filing cases in the WTO.210 The new 
weapon will have the most impact on the corporations who are not 
complying with WTO rulings as opposed to general sanctions affecting 
an entire industry. In turn, the corporations will pressure the United 
States to change its policy so that the restrictions will be taken away.  
The WTO should set out clear parameters for handing out such a 
power. The WTO should build off these proposed criteria and establish 
a third, unbiased party to determine whether the countries are not 
committing fraud or circumventing the laws.  
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The solution is that a country which falls under these conditions 
may impose a law that is facially neutral but has a discriminatory effect 
when: (1) the country is developing, (2) the developing country has an 
enforceable judgment by the WTO against a developed country’s 
law(s), (3) the developed country has not complied with the judgment 
within a specific time frame, and (4) the developing country must show 
that the developed country’s noncompliance is negatively impacting its 
economy. The goal of such a “weapon” in the hands of a developing 
country is to deter non-compliance with WTO rulings, thereby 
equalizing the playing field that is the world market.  
 
